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Introduction
This paper is about the involvement of national and especially regional parliaments in EU decision-mak-
ing. The focus on regional parliaments is justified by the fact that the relationship between regional par-
liaments and EU-institutions is hardly studied, although in a substantial number of member states, it are
legislative regions and their parliaments that are most obviously confronted with EU legislation.
A number of relating questions will be adressed in this paper. The first question is about the actual
possibilities national and regional parliaments have to influence European decisions. Secondly we look
at the new provisions in the EU Constitutional Treaty: is the role of the national/regional parliaments
strengthened and to what extent? Also, are there other possibilities to give parliaments a bigger say in
the European decision-making and why are they not adopted by the Convention or by the IGC? And last-
ly, but very important, what preconditions must be fulfilled (especially by the national/regional parlia-
ments themselves) to fully exploit the provisions and opportunities they have under the current treaties
and the new constitution in a constructive way.
But we start with some preliminary remarks on the place of national/regional parliaments in the EU
multilevel governance system.6
Is There Still a Role for National/Regional Parliaments 
in the EU Multilevel Governance (MLG)-System? 
Preliminary Remarks
Studying decision-making in the European Union is a complex matter since there is no single model to
describe the way decisions are taken. Different procedures apply to different policy domains and a whole
range of informal practices makes things even more complicated. Since a couple of years, the MLG-met-
aphor is used to highlight the fact that different levels are involved (EU, national, regional, sometimes
even local), as are different actors (also non-governmental actors). Moreover, by using the word ‘gov-
ernance’ it is stressed that there is no single centre of authority (‘government’).
Literature on MLG tries to underpin these assumptions with empirical facts for different policy are-
as. But the debate about MLG offers more than a a mere description of a way of governing the Union, it
also brings more fundamental questions about the democratic character of this form of governance. The
involvement of many actors (as suggested by the MLG-metaphor) could probably be seen as a good
thing: territorial as well as functional interests do have a say in the policy formulation. From a democratic
point of view it is desirable that as many voices as possible are heard in the decision-making process.
But we have to make some critical remarks. In the first place, the involvement of many actors in the
decision-making has to do with only one aspect of democracy, that is the input-side. We can also look
at democracy on output-side: the policy should be ‘good’ for as many people as possible. Participation
is one, crucial, dimension of democracy, but it is not the only one. Effectiveness is important as well. I
will briefly return to this point at the end of this section.
Secondly, although the involvement of many actors and interests in the policy formulation could rep-
resent added value, representation is not necessarily ‘fair’. Especially when functional organisations and
private actors are involved, important representation problems could arise. The most fundamental criti-
cism is that some groups succeed more quickly in taking part in this type of governance than others. Put
differently, some interests are for numerous reasons not organised strongly enough to take part in deci-
sion-making. E.g. economically well-endowed groups or highly organised groups have less dificulties
in getting involved in decision-making than other groups (see e.g. Andersen, Burns 1996: 246; Katz,
Wessels 1999: 244-245). Most academics agree that the evolution by which functional organisations are
taking over functions from territorial representatives (members of parliament) cannot be stopped.
Wessels and Katz say that “the most likely future appears to be a decline of parliamentary democracy.”
(Wessels, Katz 1999: 14) Almost ten years ago Andersen and Burns even talked about post-parliamen-
tary democracy and they did mean the following:
“[…] formal parliamentary arrangements and decision-making are replaced to a large extent by the principle
that directly affected parties have the right to participate in and influence policy- and law-making. This is the
basis for self-representation and specialised representation in particular policy networks or sub-governments.”
(Andersen, Burns 1996: 234-235)
This is a huge challenge to our traditional view on democracy in which parliaments contribute to-
wards the legitimacy of political projects. It is probably too early to speak of the final end of parliamen-Hendrik Vos
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tary democracy, but it does not alter the fact that there is a shift in decision-making: from parliamentary
bodies to groups and networks, in which public and private actors negotiate.
But because of the aforementioned representation problems, some kind of parliamentary involve-
ment is still desirable, alongside the probably unstoppable tendency to involve other actors as well. More
specifically, parliaments have a better position than many other participants in the process in order to
keep an eye on the broad outlines of different measures. They can reflect on the consequences of policy
choices in long term. They can also reflect on the political and often ideological choices which are in-
cluded in the draft decisions and which are not always reflected on by experts and lobbies. European de-
cisions – how technical they might look at first sight – involve political choices: about the relation
between ecology and economy, about the importance of cultural diversity, about the range of social top-
ics and of liberalisation, about agriculture and development etc. All European directives and regulations
reflect in a certain way political choices and priorities and especially a vision of how European society
has to look like. Members of parliament, mandated by the electorate, are in a good position to take this
into account.
Moreover, parliaments can fulfil a warning function if it seems that certain less organised interests
do not succeed in getting through the networks and as such are systematically threatened to be ignored.
Furthermore, they can set the agenda by, basing themselves on their knowledge and analysis of regional
and national problems, urging the EU to take action.
If parliaments succeed in contributing all this in the debate during the decision-making procedure,
they prove their surplus value. The involvement of parliaments can enrich the European output qualita-
tively.
For these reasons the European Parliament has an important role to play. This parliament has got
considerably more power than before and its influence is often underestimated, but it did not take over
all the traditional functions of national and regional parliaments. Crucial steps in the decision-making
process escape a direct democratic control from the European Parliament, whilst national/regional par-
liaments have an opportunity to exercise control over e.g. Council of Minister-activities. So, all parlia-
ments have their role in enforcing the legitimacy of European decisions and they are very
complementary. It is for example not very realistic to suppose that the European Parliament should get
the same role within the European construction as national parliaments in national politics. Many authors
also point out the fact that there is no European ‘demos’: Europeans shall only perceive the European
Parliament as ‘their’ parliament when they really consider themselves Europeans. All in all there are few
‘European organisations’ the population can connect to and that could contribute to a European citizen-
ship. There are no real European political parties yet1 and European elections still concern national top-
ics. We also have to emphasise that the distance between the elected and his electors on European level
is very huge: Wessels calculated that in the national parliaments there is one elected person per 54.844
inhabitants, while one European member of parliament represents 429.729 inhabitants (Wessels 1999a:
106). So for various reasons, the European Parliament cannot immediately take over all functions of the
other parliaments. Who wants to enforce democracy in Europe cannot only pay attention to the European
Parliament. Also the parliaments of the regions and member states have an important role to play.
At the political level as well it is often admitted that parliaments will have to contribute to the legit-
imisation of the European project. In the Convention, founded in December 2000 during the Laeken Eu-
ropean Council, this topic was an important subject of conversation. The Laeken Declaration, in which
more or less an agenda was set up for the convention debates, mentioned the matter explicitly and a
number of questions were formulated:
“The national parliaments also contribute towards the legitimacy of the European project. The declaration on
the future of the Union, annexed to the Treaty of Nice, stressed the need to examine their role in the European
integration.
[…]
A […] question, which also relates to democratic legitimacy, involves the role of national parliaments. Should
they be represented in a new institution, alongside the Council and the European Parliament? Should they have
1. Art. 191 EC says that political parties play an important role in the integration within the EU: “They contribute to forming
a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.” But until now, there are no real
European parties; regional and national parties are a part of rather loosely structured political families on European level.National/Regional Parliaments and EU Decision-Making under the New Constitutional Treaty
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a role in areas of European action in which the European Parliament has no competence? Should they focus
on the division of competence between Union and member states, for example through preliminary checking
of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity?”
Although little or no attention was devoted to the role of regional parliaments, the same Laeken Dec-
laration also stressed the importance of the subnational level in general, more specifically of the ‘regions
with legislative powers’.
During the Convention a lot of thought was put into the position parliaments will take in the EU of
tomorrow. It was in this vein that ‘Convention Working Group IV on the role of national parliaments’
was set up. The questions from the Laeken Declaration, but also many others, created a framework for
the debate. We will return to the results of this debate further in this contribution. That parliaments still
have a role to play seemed to be the starting point. 
One last remark: if we say that an involvement of national/regional parliaments in EU decision-mak-
ing could represent added value from a democratic point of view, this does not mean that those parlia-
ments should be capable of blocking every European measure. Therefore the need for a powerful
European policy is too great. Current problems often have an international dimension or are by-products
of economic, cultural and technological globalisation processes. Neither national states, nor regions are
capable of regulating these processes. An isolated policy is just not enough. Only a vigorous European
attitude (with respect for the principle of subsidiarity) can offer answers. Finding the balance between
efficiency and participation in the EU is difficult, but complicating the decision-making process has im-
portant consequences that should also be taken into account.9
National/Regional Parliaments in EU Decision-Making
This section explores the role national and regional parliaments actually (could) play in the EU decision-
making process. We do make a difference between various types of decisions: Treaty revisions, legisla-
tive decisions and the prelegislative story2. We also pay attention to the provisions under the new con-
stitution. At the end of this section the most relevant information is summarized in a single table.
Treaty Modifications
Important and historic European processes such as Treaty Modifications concern the future of national
and regional politics, because of the inherent consequences for their competences. This justifies the in-
volvemement of national and regional parliaments in this particular decision making procedure. The
method that is traditionally used to revise treaties is that of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) (art.
48 EU): representatives of the governments of the member states negotiate during a couple of months in
a very private atmosphere about the treaty revision, whereupon heads of state and government cut the
final knot at a European Council. The text of the treaty that has come into being that way has to be ratified
by all member states. How this occurs exactly, is arranged by every member state separately.
Parliaments and ratification
In practice we see that parliaments deal with the ratification, although in some member states also the
population can vote about it in referenda. Generally speaking, members of parliament thus vote about
basic treaties and the amendments made to them. Treaty modifications could also directly or indirectly
affect the position of the regions and their competences in a number of Member States. So in some fed-
eral states regions also are involved in this ratification procedure because the federal Chamber (such as
the German Bundesrat, in which regional ministers are seated) has to vote about the revision of treaties.
Nowhere else the influence of regional parliaments is arranged as directly as in Belgium: both the ap-
proval of the federal parliament (Chamber and Senate) and of the five regional parliaments is required.
Although the parliaments involved in the ratification in theory dispose of a lot of power (they can
prevent even one comma from being shifted, deleted or added to treaties), there is – precisely in the par-
liaments – a lot of dissatisfaction about the procedure for revising treaties. In practice, an agreement is
made between the governments of the member states which is presented to the parliaments as ‘take it or
leave it’. A refusal of ratification would immerse the EU in a constitutional crisis (Raunio, Hix 2001:
142). De facto the power of the parliaments is not that huge, although representatives of the government
anticipate the probable reaction of the parliaments during the negotiations: they make sure they do not
make decisions that are absolutely unacceptable for the home base (Munro 1996: 92).
Broadly speaking, however, we can say that an involvement in the processes leading to a Treaty
modification (negotiation-phase) would probably be more important than disposing of an ultimate veto
during the final ratification procedure. In a way this veto-power gives the ultimate means of control, but
it has to be said that it does not mean that much in practice, just because it is ‘yes’ or ‘no’; an intermediate
position is not possible.
2. Partly based on Peterson, Bomberg.Hendrik Vos
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Involvement of parliaments in the negotiation-phase: IGC
Until recently there was no explicit involvement of parliaments in the negotation-phase. Sometimes, un-
der impulse of for example the national parliamentary committee that deals with European affairs, a na-
tional or regional parliamentary debate is organised at the start of an IGC. The final aim is to give the
IGC-negotiators (head of government, foreign minister or their representatives) a ‘direction’. It is easier
for a national parliament to do so than for a regional parliament: national parliaments have more ‘grip’
on the national government. But in some federal states (e.g. Belgium, Germany) some regional parlia-
ments as well hold a debate and take a position, trying to influence the negotiators. In reality however
we notice that these debates (national or regional) are often superficial and that the same mantras are only
repeated. This type of debate can give government negotiators a general sense of direction, but it can
hardly guide them with the concrete negotiations. After all, it is difficult to monitor IGC-activities be-
cause of the lack of transparancy in these negotiations.
Involvement of parliaments in the negotiation-phase: Convention-method
In Nice (2000) it was decided that a new method to prepare treaty revisions was desirable. National par-
liaments should be more involved in this. As an answer to this the European Council of Laeken (2001)
set up a Convention. There was no treaty-base for this arrangement, but neither was it forbidden. In this
Convention representatives of the parliaments played an important part: each national parliament had to
send two delegates (as opposed to one representative of the government per member state). Also the Eu-
ropean Parliament was represented well by sixteen members. Regional parliaments were not directly in-
volved (although a member state was free to admit a representative of the federal Chamber or even of a
regional parliament in the two-man parliamentary delegation). The Committee of the Regions did ap-
point six observers: representatives of the regions and local governments. It was the task of the Conven-
tion to prepare the next IGC (2003-2004). The Convention came up with a draft constitutional treaty
which was to a large extent accepted by the IGC. This procedure can be seen as a new experiment to
change the treaties (constitution) with an important participation of parliaments. Or better: of the repre-
sentatives the parliaments have appointed. In most regions and member states it did not lead to long par-
liamentary debates. On the contrary, as we see it, most representatives worked in a way that isolated them
from ‘their’ parliament. Broadly speaking, we cannot talk of a permanent feedback process. The conven-
tion formula offers possibilities to get a broader parliamentary debate going about important aspects of
European integration, but it is not a guarantee in itself. It is up to the parliaments to organise the debate
and give inspiration (maybe even a mandate) to the representatives. It is not very useful if this parlia-
mentary debate restricts itself to repeating the mantras that have been in use for decades. In that case par-
liamentary involvement is a rather boring spectacle. Eventually the representatives will end up in a very
dynamic negotiation process, where they are confronted with the often very diverse opinions of other
participants. From superficial debates little inspiration can be drawn and in concrete issues they shall
sometimes take points of view that are not necessarily based on the parliamentary debate. If national ànd
regional parliaments really want to take up the debate about treaty modifications (and more in general
about Europe’s future), the whole negotiation process and the dynamic that lives in the Convention, have
to be followed strictly and members of parliament shall have to take into account the visions of other
regions and member states.
But generally speaking, the involvement by national and regional parliaments in the process and the
signals that can be given in an early stadium could become more important and effective than the threat
of a veto that can only be declared after the negotiations. 
The role of parliaments in treaty modifications under the new constitution
Under the new constitution, the Convention-method for Treaty modification is not an option anymore,
but becomes the normal procedure (article IV-443). A delegation of the Committee of the Regions in an
advisory capacity is not an obligation (but this could be decided on an ad hoc-basis). There is also a more
simple procedure for the modification of certain parts of the constitution. In this procedure the final say
rests with the national parliaments as well. The installation of a Convention is however not required, but
modifications that aim to widen the competences of the Union are explicitly excluded from this proce-
dure (article IV-445). National/Regional Parliaments and EU Decision-Making under the New Constitutional Treaty
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Legislative measures
European directives, regulations or decisions (and in the future: laws and framework laws) do have bind-
ing power, be it in their entirity or with regard to the result. European rules have to be implemented by
the member states and their regions or they draw margins limiting the legislative freedom of national and
regional authorities. Anyway, they form the framework in which the following years national and re-
gional transport and environmental and development policies etc. will be pursued.
In this overview, we focus on the part national and regional parliaments could play in the making of
EU-legislation. We give a rather general image and we do not extensively discuss the various ways par-
ticipation is dealt with in separate member states and regions. Sometimes there are separate arrange-
ments in different pillars and for specific policy areas that (could) influence the role of national and
regional parliaments. Here we restrict ourselves to generalisations and put emphasis on what is still
called the first pillar (where most of EU activity takes place; moreover this concerns the domains of pow-
er of the regions). The legislative trajectory in these areas starts with a proposal from the Commission.
The final decision is taken jointly by the Council of Ministers (by qualified majority vote) and the Euro-
pean Parliament. In some more sensitive areas the role of the European Parliament is only advisory and/
or the Council has to decide by unanimity. Some other institutions, such as the Committee of the Regions
and the Economic and Social Committee act in an advisory capacity. Some members of regional parlia-
ments are a part of the Committee of the Regions, but its influence on decision-making is for various
reasons so negligible3 that we do not discuss it further.
National/regional parliaments and ‘their’ ministers in the Council
In the Council, ministers of fifteen member states meet. The meetings are prepared by a Committee of
Permanent Representatives (COREPER) that bases itself on discussions in numerous working groups,
in which the member states are represented. The members of these working groups are often experts
from the administration or diplomats connected to the Permanent Representation to the EU. Recent re-
search shows that regional public servants and experts in federal states often are part of these council
working groups, dependent on the points on the agenda (Boucké, Vos 2001: 134; Vos, Boucké, Devos
2002). Broadly speaking, a direct (national/regional) parliamentary control on what happens in the coun-
cil working groups and the coreper is lacking in almost every member state.
For the ministers, who eventually cut the knot, this can be different: each minister has a responsibil-
ity for his deeds to ‘his’ national parliament. In this field there was a kind of ‘permissive consensus’ for
a long time (Katz, Wessels 1999: 245): most parliaments did not interfere with European affairs and min-
isters could do what they wanted in the European meetings. When parliaments realised that European
politics had an impact on their powers, this changed. In all member states and in some regions parlia-
ments have already founded committees concerning European affairs (Raunio, Hix 2000: 156). The ex-
act powers and the impact differ from state to state (Smith, Eivind 1996; Kassim 2000b: 240). Some of
these committees concentrate on almost every measure that has to be discussed by the Council, while
other committees only follow the general guidelines of Europolitics and can in the best case discuss
points that are dealt with on European meetings of heads of state and government. The most extreme
model consists of a minister asking a mandate for every session of the Council, in which can be found
how far the minister can go in the negotiations and when he has to vote for or against. For various reasons
this extreme system is not applied anywhere. In Denmark it is probably approached nearest.
Some parliaments are looking for ways to refine the system of the ‘instructed minister’ and especial-
ly enforce it: parliaments want to exert more supervision on how a minister behaves4. But suppose that
in every member state parliaments gave their ministers precise instructions. If the ministers want to ex-
3. Problems have to do with for example the fact that it only concerns an advising organ, where Council, Parliament or
Commission without any responsibility can ignore every point of view of the Committee of the Regions. Moreover, the
composition of this Committee is quite unclear: it consists of representatives of both local and regional administrations,
often with very different interests. See a.o. Vos 1997, 1999b.
4. Research by Katz in national parliaments shows that national members of parliament do answer ‘too little’ in great
numbers to the question ‘Does the national parliament exert too much or too little supervision on the position the
government of your country takes in the Council? (Katz 1999: 40-41) (the average on a 7-point scale in 10 countries was
5,22). Research among a large number of national (1392) and EU members of parliament (310) shows that a majority is in
favour of the system of ‘instructed ministers’.Hendrik Vos
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ceed their mandate, they first have to give feedback to their parliament or they can be sanctioned by the
home base. Obviously this would make the meetings more rigorous, looking for compromises will be
more difficult and it would slow down the process. Decision-making, especially in the EU, where visions
of various cultures and interests have to be reconciled, asks for compromises. Often package deals are
necessary to overcome the deadlock and make headway. For this form of decision-making confidential
meetings are required, with a limited number of participants who dispose of a relatively ample mandate
(Sejersted 1996: 126; Smith 1996: 15). If twentyfive or more (also regional) parliaments mingled in the
concrete negotiations and strictly defined the negotiation margins of the ministers and the members of
the working groups, the dynamic of the negotiations would suffer from this. It would for example be cra-
zy to formulate in an open parliamentary debate a relapse position; this would seriously weaken the ne-
gotiation position of the minister and the parliamentary influence would have the contrary effect (see
Gustavsson 1996: 116). Kassim, Peters and Wright point out another element: “Even if there are not par-
tisan differences over policy there may be sufficient institutional jealousy to create difficulties if the par-
liament is an active player in the co-ordination exercise.” (Kassim, Peters, Wright 2000: 17). Put
differently, there is a risk that parliaments will feel obliged to make it clear once in a while that they can
block a measure. If each parliament does it in turns, there is danger of a deadlock in numerous dossiers.
The conclusion of Hilf and Burmeister is probably correct:
“Any voting on EC secondary legislation by national parliaments would not lead to ‘more’ democracy but to
a rather inefficient, if not chaotic, situation and thus finally to a demise in democratic legitimacy” (Hilf, Bur-
meister 1996: 74)
The situation becomes even more complicated if we turn to regional parliaments. In the situation
where a regional minister is seated in the Council5 he/she has to defend a national position making it
unrealistic to give this regional minister exact instructions from a regional parliament.
The idea of giving ministers an exact and well-defined mandate seems very tempting and is easy to
implement (treaty modifications are not required for this), but it has a perverse effect. At first sight this
measure seems very sound from a democratic point of view, but doing this would endanger the integra-
tion dynamics.
This does not mean, however, that national/regional parliaments have to stand by and watch when
it comes to European decision-making. It is not because it is not realistic to mingle in the concrete nego-
tiation process by taking away every room for manoeuvre from the ministers that parliaments have to
turn away from Brussels. Parliamentary debates about various measures that are under discussion, can
without a doubt embellish the vision of a minister and influence his/her point of view. The debate can
contribute to the fact that the minister gets a clear view on national and regional importance and parlia-
ments can give their ministers a clear direction or even recommendations, which could impossibly be
ignored completely (Hilf, Burmeister 1996: 74). From that point of view it could be useful to let (both
regional and national) members of parliament participate in the co-ordination committees where the ‘na-
tional standpoint’ is being formulated. If a final decision seriously deviates from the position parliament
has taken, a minister can later be asked to give an explanation. Then a minister could justify why he/she
had to accept a compromised point of view to prevent the realisation of a final text that was even further
away from desiderata of parliament. If decision-making processes are followed closely by national and
regional parliaments, they will be confronted with the points of view of other member states and interest
groups, what allows them to situate the end result in a better way.
Observers have noticed that the switchover to more polls by (qualified) majority leads to the fact that
the impact of national parliaments on European decision-making weakens6. Clear instructions can be
given to a national minister, but it is possible that he has to taste defeat during a poll. Nevertheless, the
5. The conclusion that many legislative measures that are treated in the council are a regional matter in the federal member
states, led to the fact that in the Maastricht Treaty the possibility was taken into account that a regional minister could be
seated in the Council, if this minister could bind the whole member state (art. 203 EC). In most federal states a system has
been worked out thanks to which regional ministers can effectively participate in sessions of the council meetings (together
with a federal minister or not) (See a.o.: Cygan 2001: 164-165 (United Kingdom), 180 (Germany); Müller 2000: 214
(Austria); Hilf, Burmeister 1996 (Germany); Vos (1999a) (Belgium)).
6. See a.o. Rideau 1996: 167National/Regional Parliaments and EU Decision-Making under the New Constitutional Treaty
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resolution that is voted that way is also applicable in the member state where parliament was against it.
The question posed by Smith is a very important one: “[W]ho should you charge in an instance where
your own minister, in a case submitted to decisions by qualified majorities, actually voted against a con-
troversial decision by which you are bound anyhow?” (Smith 1996: 15). The democratic deficit that
threatens to arise that way can only be filled by giving the European Parliament the power of co-decision.
For most areas that fall under the qualified majority ballot, this already is the case.
National/regional parliaments and the European Parliament
In many policy areas, the European Parliament is quite powerful and recent research shows that the
points of view of the Parliament are taken seriously7: many by the Parliament voted amendments survive
the decision-making procedure and can be found in the final texts, often against the original point of view
of the Council. Michael Shackleton, a prominent observer: “legislation is not simply a product of agree-
ment in the Council […] the EP can alter policy outcomes in significant ways.” (Shackleton 2002: 107).
Before the first direct elections for the European Parliament (1979), the latter was composed of
members of national parliaments. Formally speaking there are no links anymore between national or re-
gional parliaments and the European Parliament. However, good contacts and a smooth interaction be-
tween on the one hand national and regional parliaments and on the other hand the European Parliament
(informal or formalised in committees) can contribute to a better defence of specific national and region-
al interests. Concrete problems or concerns can be brought under the attention of members of the Euro-
pean Parliament from for example the same electoral district or the same political family. In most
countries the same political parties compete for seats in the national/regional parliament and in the Eu-
ropean Parliament. So party lines link members of the European Parliament with their colleagues in the
national and regional parliaments. The headquarters of the political parties can act as some kind of an
interface between them. This is a more informal technique for national and regional parliaments to get
grip on European decisions.
How to deal with European matters in national/regional parliaments?
If parliaments want to keep an eye on the activities of their minister in the Council or want to follow what
is going on in the European Parliament, it is of course important that they dispose of enough information.
A protocol (no.9), annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, determines that all discussion documents and
proposals of the Commission have to be delivered to the (national) parliaments. Regional parliaments
are not mentioned in this protocol, but in practice the proposals of the Commission are also admissible
via the internet, so members of regional parliaments can easily get them. Moreover, a period of at least
six weeks is foreseen between the introduction of a proposal and the decision of the Council, exactly to
give parliaments the time to think about it and maybe give their ministers some instructions. 
Research shows that most parliaments do not succeed in playing the ball quickly. Some authors no-
tice that the monitoring of European measures brings along practical problems. Norton says it this way
“[t]he existing workload of some parliaments means that it will be difficult for them to be more involved
in EU affairs.” (Norton 1996: 32; also Kassim 2000a: 44; Pedersen 2000: 232-233). In fact this is not
correct, because sooner or later parliaments will be confronted with European rules anyway. Of course
it is important that parliament disposes of (among others personal) support, but this is a matter of internal
organisation for the parliaments themselves8.
It should be logical that the ‘functional’ or ‘technical’ committees of the parliaments, each for their
own policy area, follow all relevant European initiatives from an early stage (and thus not the ‘Standing
Committee for European Affairs’). For defining a national or regional interest the various specialised
committees dispose of a lot of expertise and moreover will be confronted most directly with European
rules when executing their activities. Also Sejersted sees it like this:
7. That does not alter the fact that there still are numerous areas (among others the second and third pillar) where the
European Parliament has little influence, while national and regional parliaments neither have much to say. Here we can
speak of a democratic deficit.
8. Sejersted studied the Norwegian Parliament and concludes that there are few parliamentary assistants that keep themselves
busy with research concerning European affairs. (Sejersted 1996: 143)Hendrik Vos
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“In order to influence European policy a parliament must integrate it into everyday parliamentary life, and look
upon it as an extension of national policy, not as an extraneous matter to be treated separately and with care.”
(Sejersted 1996: 156)
European politics do not have to be snuggled away; it is a matter for all the members of parliament.
The role of parliaments in making legislation under the new constitution
The aforementioned protocol (no.9), annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam is preserved in a revised way.
The “Protocol on the Role of Member States’ National Parliaments in the European Union” says that not
only draft legislative acts, but also consultation documents, the annual legislative programme and other
instruments of legislative planning shall be forwarded to the national parliaments by the Commission.
National parliaments shall also have minutes from the legislative Council’s meetings. These provisions
on the supply of information apply to both chambers of bicameral systems, but regional parliaments are
not mentioned at all. (But in fact, most of these documents can also be found on the internet.) Just as in
the Amsterdam-Protocol interparliamentary cooperation (COSAC) is encouraged. CALRE, the Confer-
ence of the European Regional Legislative Assemblies, is not mentioned.
More innovative for the parliaments is another protocol: the “Protocol on the Application of the Prin-
ciples of Subsidiarity and Proportionality”.
Subsidiarity means that what a smaller unit can do in an adequate way does not have to be done by
a larger unit, unless it performs better9. This is the situation at this moment: in a Protocol (no. 30) an-
nexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, it is said that the Commission has to justify its legislative proposals
in the light of subsidiarity. The Council and the European Parliament have to investigate this and take
into account the subsidiarity principle throughout the decision-making procedure. In other words, self-
discipline of the European institutions is very important. Judicial control on subsidiarity on European
level is practised nowadays by the Court of Justice. But at the moment an appeal for annulment because
of violation of the subsidiarity principle can only be started by directly and individually involved per-
sons, member states, the Council, the Commission or the European Parliament. National parliaments
cannot directly commence a proceeding. Neither can regions (and their parliaments).
The Protocol which is attached to the new constitution starts with the statement that the Commission
shall consult widely before proposing legislative acts. It says explicitly that the regional and local dimen-
sion shall be taken into account. The Protocol is especially innovative in the sense that it includes an ex-
tra ‘test’. During the Convention debates various scenarios were formulated to extend political control
(the foundation of an ad hoc inspection body, the entry of a representative of the parliaments in the na-
tional delegations of the Council etc.). Finally the Convention and the IGC have decided to set up an
‘early warning system’ of a political nature, intended to reinforce the monitoring of compliance with the
principle of subsidiarity by national parliaments, without complicating or lengthening the legislative
process too much. If national parliaments think the principle of subsidiarity is being breached, they can
sound the alarm within six weeks from the date of transmission of the draft legislative act. National par-
liaments have to consult regional parliaments when it concerns matters belonging to the competences of
the latter. Where at least one third of national parliaments issue reasoned opinions on the Commission
proposal’s non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, the Commission shall review its proposal.
After such review, the Commission may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw its proposal. The Com-
mission must give reasons for its decision.
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to hear actions brought by Member States on grounds of
infringement of the principle of subsidiarity, where appropriate at the request of their national parlia-
ments. Regions and their parliaments are not mentioned, but new is that the Committee of the Regions
also will have the possibility to bring actions to the Court of Justice when it concerns the subsidiarity
principle in those areas where they have to be consulted.
It is clear that if national parliaments and (more indirectly) regional parliaments want to take up this
new role and be a watchdog over the principle of subsidiarity, they have to follow up European legisla-
tion from the early stages. Six weeks is a short time, so they must play the ball quickly if they want to
9. See the note of Inigo Mendes de Vigo to the members of the Convention concerning the mandate of the working group on
the subsidiarity principle (CONV 71/02 2002: 2).National/Regional Parliaments and EU Decision-Making under the New Constitutional Treaty
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use the early warning mechanism. Pieces of draft legislation have to be studied in detail and this can only
be done by the functional/technical standing committees (see above).
The prelegislative phase
Practice shows that once the decision-making process formally starts, namely when a proposal for a reg-
ulation, directive or other legislative measure is introduced to the Council and to the European Parlia-
ment, there is little space left for fundamental changes. Above it was said that national and regional
parliaments have an interest in following the current decision-making in depth. If these parliaments only
concentrate on pending legislative proposals, then they are overtaken by the events.
The brainstorming phase is very important in European decision-making. Especially what concerns
activities in the framework of the first pillar, the Commission tries to get a more exact picture in this
phase of what lives in the member states and among other people and organisations involved. It is wasted
effort for the Commission if means are invested in drawing up a legislative measure many member states
and powerful interest groups are against (Decock 2001: 13). So around certain policy topics the Com-
mission creates temporary or lasting, formal or informal networks. Functionally organised interests are
involved in this and the Commission will regularly (through the Permanent Representation) ask the
member states to delegate experts to preparatory meetings.
If it concerns policy topics that in federal states fall within the atmosphere of the competence of re-
gions, it happens that expertise has to be sought in the regional administration. In that case it is possible
that members of the regional administration become a contact person for the Commission. Also many
‘regional information offices’ that appeared out of the blue during the past decades on and around the
Schumanplein often succeed in taking part in this phase of decision-making if it concerns topics that are
important for them. In many respects they function in the same way as functional lobby groups. During
this whole process national and regional parliaments are hardly involved (Pernice 2001: 15). Often they
do not even know that there are preparatory discussions going on.
National/regional parliaments and their involvement in informal preparatory negotiations
Because of the informal character of these processes it is not easy for parliaments to stay informed about
what ‘is going to happen’. Of course it helps if a parliament has good contacts with interest groups and
especially if it is informed by ‘its’ government when this government is invited by the services of the
Commission for consultations. In practice, this information comes from the member state’s Permanent
Representation to the EU. Most regions with legislative powers have close links or even their own rep-
resentative in those Permanent Representations (via the regional information office to the EU) (Vos,
Boucké, Devos 2002). Most of the time a relatively detailed assessment can be made of the expected
Commission initiatives. With some fingerspitzengefühl for European politics it is possible to estimate
quite precisely what topics will be discussed on the preparatory level. So if a national or a regional par-
liament wants to know what is going on in the brainstorming phase, there are channels it can use.
Given the importance of the prelegislative phase it is not only useful to organise parliamentary de-
bates about European measures that can already be found in an advanced stadium of decision-making
(as we said before), but it is also useful to study European green and white papers, the programme of
work of the Commission etc. in the relevant functional or technical standing committees of national and
regional parliaments. A parliament can deduct from this which decisions are planned on medium term
and can think about the consequences. If a parliament judges it can add a specific point of view to the
discussion, there is no reason not to do it. It can make a ‘written statement’, it can give instructions to a
national or regional expert in a specific working party or it can make (informal) contacts with the Euro-
pean Parliament which – since a generalisation of the co-decision procedure – is involved more and more
in the prelegislative process. If all kinds of lobbies can make clear their points of view, it is probably
legitimate a parliament does the same by making clear a point supported by a majority in this parliament.
The prelegislative phase does not have to be the private hunting ground of experts and functional interest
groups. Some authors say it very explicitly: Hendrik Vos
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“It has […] been argued that national parliaments should re-think their way of operating, and start to act more
as lobbyists, especially before the Commission […]” (Sejersted 1996: 148)
Or:
 “It will become more and more important to see, to what extent candidates for membership of the parliaments
[…] are able to participate in the European communication and networking systems, to pass the will of the
people over to the European level.” (Pernice 2001: 17)
In the first section of this contribution we talked more extensively about the added value national as
well as regional parliaments still have in the European decision-making system, besides functional or-
ganisations.
The importance of capacity building in the national/regional parliaments
But once again, participation in the prelegislative process can only occur when parliaments succeed in
anticipating the formal decision-making process. To do this, parliaments have to keep an overview on
what is about to happen in the legislative field. This requires good contacts with the Permanent Repre-
sentations and/or the regional information office to the EU. It also requires a thorough insight of the
members of parliament and their staff in the less formal (but not less crucial) side of the European deci-
sion-making process and the preparedness to participate in this (what is not really a traditional parlia-
mentary activity). But it is a unique and relatively effective possibility to influence decision-making:
“If in Community affairs it has become more precarious to mandate or influence national ministers, then the
lesson for national parliaments is surely that they will have to try harder to influence the Commission or the
European Parliament at earlier stages.” (Munro 1996: 95)
The prelegislative phase and the new Constitution
The prelegislative phase is a mostly informal happening. It is not discussed explicitly in the new consti-
tution, apart from the emphasis on the fact that the Commission (and other institutions) shall consult
widely before adopting a proposal (Part I, Title VI: The democratic life of the Union). This is also men-
tioned in the Protocol on the Role of the National Parliaments. A better communication between the
Commission and the parliaments is recommended but (because of the informal character) the constitu-
tion remains vague on how to organise this.
Summary table
Without pretending to be complete, next table gives an overview of some of the most notable possibili-
ties national parliaments have to influence European decisions (modification of treaties, legislation, prel-
egislative phase). In a second column we look at the regional parliaments: are they able to use the same
channels and provisions? And if yes, automatically? Or does it depend on the internal situation and pro-
visions in the Member State? Some general remarks are given in the third column, e.g. an assessment of
the importance of this particular way to influence the European Union. In the last column, we give an
overview of what needs to be done by national/regional parliaments in order to fully exploit this specific
way to influence European decisions. In other words, what are the preconditions, the critical success fac-
tors which have to be fulfilled by the parliaments themselves if they want to ‘use’ this particular channel
to put their stamp on European decisions.N
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(Potential) role of national 
parliaments
And regional parlia-
ments?
Remarks Preconditions/critical success factors
Parliament can demand from 
the national government to 
be involved in the formula-
tion of the M.S. standpoint 
(to be defended in the IGC)
Depends on the 
‘openness’ of the 
M.S. government
It is difficult to moni-
tor IGC-activities 
(lack of transparan-
cy), and thus difficult 
to control the M.S. 
representatives
– Parliaments must be able to provide the negotiators 
with useful arguments
– Fundamental debate on EU-future in parliament to 
make it possible to formulate a well-thought position
– Realistic analysis of different IGC-scenarios
Ratification: final vote on 
IGC-result
If M.S. decides so – ‘Take it or leave it’
– In some M.S.: refer-
endum
– Debate on the outcome of the IGC
Optional: installation of a 
‘Convention’ to prepare the 
IGC. Members of national 
parliament are represented 
in this Convention.
If the national parlia-
ment decides to in-
clude a member of a 
federal chamber or of 
a regional parliament 
in the delegation
Allows for a bigger 
involvement in the de-
cision-making proc-
ess
– Regular feedback by the representatives to the Parlia-
ment (to avoid the situation in which the representa-
tives work ‘isolated’ from their parliaments).
– Follow-up of the Convention debates in the parlia-
ment
– Fundamental debate on EU-future in parliament to 
make it possible to formulate a well-thought position, 
which has to be defended by the representatives.
Convention method: re-
quired for fundamental 
Treaty changes. Members of 
national parliament are rep-
resented in this Convention.
If the national parlia-
ment decides to in-
clude a member of a 
federal chamber or of 
a regional parliament 
in the delegation
Allows for a bigger 
involvement in the de-
cision-making proc-
ess
– Regular feedback by the representatives to the Parlia-
ment (to avoid the situation in which the representa-
tives work ‘isolated’ from their parliaments).
– Follow-up of the Convention debates in the parlia-
ment
– Fundamental debate on EU-future in parliament to 
make it possible to formulate a well-thought position, 
which has to be defended by the representatives.
Actual situation
New provisions un-
der the Constitution
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And regional parlia-
ments?
Remarks Preconditions/critical success factors
Scrutiny of ministers in the 
Council (Parliaments re-
ceive information and there 
is a min. 6-week time period 
between the introduction of 
a proposal and the Council 
decision)
– Only indirect, even 
if a regional minis-
ter is in the Council.
– M.S. can decide to 
involve regions in 
the formulation of a 
national position.
– No direct informa-
tion from EU-insti-
tutions (but often 
available on the in-
ternet)
– Radical system of 
‘instructed minis-
ter’ will obstruct 
EU decision-mak-
ing, but parliaments 
can give a direction 
or recommenda-
tions to ministers
– Most useful if mem-
bers of parliament 
participate in the 
co-ordination com-
mittees where the 
‘national stand-
point’ is being for-
mulated.
– Permanent attention for EU developments in different 
policy areas.
– Technical/functional committees responsible for fol-
low-up of European legislation in ‘their’ area of com-
petences: MPs should not treat EU as ‘foreign policy’
– Capacity-building in parliaments: how to deal with 
European decision-making procedures?
– Parliament should be able to play the ball quickly.
– Ministers should appear before parliament before and 
after Council meetings.
Contact with Members of 
European Parliament: giving 
them information, recom-
mendations, etc.
Idem – Mostly informal
– Especially via party 
affiliation
– Permanent attention for EU matters in all policy areas.
– Follow-up of European legislation by political parties.
– Capacity-building in political parties: how to deal 
with European decision-making procedures?
If a national parliament 
thinks the principle of sub-
sidiarity is breached, it can 
sound the alarm within 6 
weeks. If 1/3 of nat. parlia-
ments do so, the Commis-
sion shall review its 
proposal.
Parliament can request their 
M.S. to bring actions to the 
Court of Justice
National parliaments 
have to consult re-
gional parliaments in 
the process of moni-
toring compliance 
with the principle of 
subsidiarity.
No direct involve-
ment, no access to 
Court
– no ‘red card’ role 
for parliaments: the 
Commission may 
decide to maintain 
its proposal
– Follow-up of European legislation from the early 
stages. Pieces of draft legislation have to be studied in 
detail and this can only be done by the functional/
technical standing committees.
– Parliament should be able to play the ball quickly.
Actual situation
New provisions un-
der the Constitution
 LEGISLATIVE MEASURES
(ESPCIALLY 1ST PILLAR)N
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(Potential) role of national 
parliaments
And regional par-
liaments?
Remarks Preconditions/critical success factors
Parliaments as lobbyists Idem Interesting way to influ-
ence decision-making.
– Parliaments must be able to make an assessment of 
expected Commission initiatives (capacity-building!)
– Participation in European networking systems
– Establishing links with Permanent Representation and 
Regional Information Office (to get information about 
the ‘brainstorming phase’)
Actual situation and 
new constitution
 PRELEGISLATIVE PHASE20
Conclusion
In this contribution we started with the argument that parliaments still have an important role to play in
governing the EU. This is true for the European Parliament, but also for national and regional parlia-
ments. They do not need to become frills, such as for example the royal families, who are still there for
the symbolics, but in general have no real power. Parliaments can be crucial links in the legitimacy of
the European project: they still have responsibilities for inspiring, influencing, orientating the policy.
During the past decades national parliaments began establishing specialised standing committees in or-
der to follow up European politics. Meanwhile, various regional parliaments have followed this exam-
ple. But this does not necessarily mean that they succeed in getting involved in European decision-
making. The new constitution strengthens the position of the national parliaments to some extent but it
remains to be seen if the parliaments can seize the occasion.
Turning back to the questions formulated in the introduction of this contribution, we come to the fol-
lowing conclusions:
(1) European treaties make it possible for national parliaments to get involved in European decision-
making to a certain extent. E.g. scrutiny of national ministers is facilitated by the fact that they get
information and that a minimum 6-weeks time period is foreseen for the evaluation of proposals. The
table at the end of the previous section summarizes some of those provisions in the first column. It
also makes clear that there are rather informal methods (not explicitly mentioned in the treaties) to
participate as well. E.g. parliaments can participate in the formulation of a national position (to be
defended in the Council). The new constitution strengthens the position of the national parliaments
to some extent, e.g. by giving them a role in the control of the principle of subsidiarity and by intro-
ducing the Convention method as a standard procedure for revising the treaties.
(2) There are more radical alternatives to strengthen the position of parliaments. We can think of a red
card role for parliaments (if parliaments raise the alarm the Commission should withdraw its pro-
posal) or the introduction of a (whether or not merely advisory) second chamber at the European par-
liament, a kind of senate composed of representatives of the parliaments. Those radical alternatives
have some disadvantages: there is a risk of blocking EU-decision-making or lengthening the proc-
ess. A stronger role for parliaments does not mean that they should be capable of blocking every Eu-
ropean measure. After all, it is not useful that every measure – before being applicable – finds a
parliamentary majority in each of the (already twenty-five) member states and their regions. At first
sight, this would be very democratic (member states or regions shall not be confronted any more
with European rules, which they do not support), but this would end the European integration proc-
ess. The Union would not be able any more to take these vigorous decisions, which are necessary to
handle the international problems or to ‘harness’ the globalisation.
(3) Regional parliaments are not referred to in the existing treaties, and only to a very marginal extent
in the new constitution. This is somewhat strange because many European rules have a regional di-
mension: for several policy areas in different member states primarily the regions are involved in the
European rules and have to implement them. In these domains, regional parliaments are confronted
with exactly the same challenges as national parliaments. The fact is that all these parliaments findNational/Regional Parliaments and EU Decision-Making under the New Constitutional Treaty
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that their legislative freedom is seriously restricted and that it is not easy to control the European
activities of the ministers. It is remarkable that one speaks about national parliaments and as such
forgets about regional parliaments.
(4) Despite the marginal attention for regional parliaments in the treaties and the new constitution, in-
dividual member states can decide to involve their regional parliaments in European decision-mak-
ing almost to the same extent as national parliaments (e.g. the treaty ratification procedure, in the
formulation of the national standpoint for specific legislative measures, …). Wether regional parlia-
ments can make use of these possibilities depends to a large degree on the internal situation in the
member states (see the second column in the aforementioned table).
(5) The realisation of the potential added value of national/regional parliaments depends on the provi-
sions in the treaties (and the new constitution), on the internal organisation of the member state (es-
pecially important for regional parliaments) but also to a large extent on the way the parliaments
handle European politics. Even without important institutional modifications parliaments can con-
siderably increase their influence on European decision-making. There are many ways to participate
in the incredible dazzling and dynamic process of European decision-making. Parliaments can be
involved in the realisation of the (national) point of view which will be defended in the Council, con-
tacts can be made with the European Parliament (whether or not formalised), members of parliament
can become part of or make contacts with the networks where the European legislation is being pre-
pared, parliaments can sometimes take up a position together etc.
So there is especially an important responsibility for the parliaments themselves: the ultimate con-
dition remains that parliaments should be prepared to integrate the European politics in their daily
activities. They should not treat EU matter as foreign policy. It is important that parliaments espe-
cially work proactive and, proceeding from their specialised standing committees, follow and judge
the developments in the different policy areas. This can make them strong players in the concrete
decision-making processes.
For national and regional parliaments this means a whole new challenge: new techniques and work
methods should be handled in order to ‘silver’ their potential added value. In this contribution we
have argued that it is too early to proclaim the end of parliamentary democracy (Andersen, Burns
1996). European integration, however, has changed political reality in the member states enormous-
ly. Parliaments, both regional and national, do have a European role in this new context. It is not
simple to take it up, but there is no alternative. A parliament (national as well as regional) that ig-
nores this role is made redundant.22
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